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“ [T]he usual opposition of first-person vs. 
third-person accounts is misleading. It makes us 
forget that so-called third-person, objective ac-
counts are done by a community of concrete peo-
ple who are embodied in their social and natural 
world as much as first-person accounts.” (Varela 
1996: 340)
« 12 » What is problematic is that this 
double-natured embeddedness (in a scien-
tific culture and life-world) of inferring has 
remained unreflected and not researched in 
cognitive science. But if we are to radically 
embody cognitive science, as Martiny ar-
gues (e.g., in §§9, 11, 20, 66), we cannot stop 
at systematic research of experience or at 
uncovering correlations with third-person 
accounts of mental phenomena, the “mild” 
neurophenomenology promises (see Petit-
mengin 2017 for the distinction between 
light or mild and deep or radical neurophe-
nomenology). What is required, is (system-
atic) reflection upon and research (see, e.g., 
Kordeš 2016 and Petitmengin 2017) into our 
own theoretical stance(s), presuppositions 
and practices (whatever they are: third-, 
first- or second-person). Namely, theories, 
research and findings are structured around 
and constituted by presuppositions, prac-
tices and values of the research community 
and the life-world we are embedded in.
« 13 »  If we do not try to understand 
and research how our own practices, values 
and viewpoints bear upon the findings and 
conclusions we draw from our research, and 
if we do not try to understand how the world 
we inhabit bears upon the very practices, 
values and viewpoints we passionately de-
fend, we cannot understand (or claim to be 
endorsing) the full scope of the circularity 
that is intrinsic to any research and under-
standing of the mind (and, possibly of the 
enactive view of cognitive science). As is suc-
cinctly put forth by Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
towards the end of his Phenomenology of 
Perception:
“ The world is inseparable from the subject, but 
from a subject who is nothing but a project of the 
world; and the subject is inseparable from the 
world, but from a world that it itself projects.” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012: 454)
« 14 » The hard question of course is, 
whether endorsing such a seemingly end-
less circularity of knowledge emergence 
means that we, in the end, cannot reveal 
“invariants of the mind” (see also Strle 
2016b). For instance, “invariant phenom-
enological structures, such as that of the 
embodied nature of cognition” (§50) that 
Varela (1996) seems to hope for (but see 
Petitmengin 2017) in his neurophenom-
enological programme. And, would we not, 
by presupposing that such invariants do, in 
fact, “exist to be discovered,” end up behav-
ing in a similar way to the way third-person 
sciences do?
« 15 » What is more, is it not that cogni-
tive science is, in fact, about “variant enti-
ties of the mind” that, to use the language 
of Ian Hacking (quoted from Brinkmann 
2005), change according to the classifica-
tions, descriptions and actions pertaining 
to them? That is, are not “entities” that cog-
nitive science tries to understand actually 
much more “fluid” and “unstable” than we 
would want to admit, possibly ever chang-
ing according to how we approach them? I 
am not sure whether the author is willing to 
endorse such a radical opening up of cog-
nitive science and it would be interesting to 
hear what he thinks about the possibility of 
such an endless “looping” of understanding 
the mind that has been, in somewhat differ-
ent words, already described by Varela in, 
for instance, his 1984 article “The Creative 
Circle: Sketches on the Natural History of 
Circularity.”
« 16 » Admittedly, even though the in-
trinsic circularity of trying to understand 
the mind, the world and their relation is, 
arguably, unavoidable, and awareness of it 
possibly necessitates a kind of existential 
uncertainty, we should not try to escape 
from it by remaining in the “safe” grounds 
of third-person sciences or, nowadays, in 
“mild” neurophenomenology. For, only by 
allowing uncertainties to remain a part of 
our life-world, can we, in fact, claim to be 
opening up cognitive science and, to quote 
Varela, allow for ethics to be “the very foun-
dation of knowledge, and also its final point” 
(Varela 1984: 323).
« 17 » All said, I strongly sympathise 
with Martiny’s call for opening up cognitive 
science. His take on what it means to be an 
embodied cognitive scientist is, in my view, a 
welcome illumination and critique of cogni-
tive science.
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> Upshot • I examine Varela’s relation-
ship with Husserl’s phenomenology, 
highlighting Varela’s acknowledgment 
of the pragmatic dimension of its phe-
nomenological reduction. I argue that 
Varela sees, in some developments of 
phenomenology, a deconstruction of the 
subject-object duality and an embodied 
view of the mind. I also highlight the 
existential dimension of Varela’s radical 
proposal, which contributes to further 
opening up and embodying cognitive 
science.
« 1 » Kristian Martiny’s target article 
successfully shows how to “open up” and 
“embody” the cognitive sciences. Draw-
ing on his research on cerebral palsy, Mar-
tiny argues that the cognitive scientist must 
question the objectivist and observational 
premises that are present in most of the clas-
sical cognitive sciences, by working simul-
taneously with first-, second- and third-per-
son approaches and by the rethinking of the 
concept of what a laboratory is by, e.g., en-
gaging with subjects in the everyday world 
and working with audio-visual media and 
theatre. Martiny argues that these strategies 
for opening up the cognitive sciences were 
first introduced by Francisco Varela more 
than 25 years ago, with his radical proposal 
of an enactive approach to cognitive science 
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and the subsequent development of neu-
rophenomenology and the second-person 
method.
« 2 » I consider Martiny’s development 
of Varela’s project effective and fruitful. 
However, I will focus my commentary on 
an aspect that is only briefly touched upon 
by Martiny: the relationship between Va-
rela’s proposal and Edmund Husserl’s phe-
nomenology, especially in §§17–19. Here, 
Martiny takes up Varela’s opinion that Hus-
serl’s phenomenology lacks a pragmatic di-
mension, without investigating Varela’s later 
comments to the contrary. In addition, I 
would like to highlight a further, existential 
dimension of Varela’s radical proposal that is 
not mentioned in Martiny’s article, one that 
contributes to further opening up and em-
bodying cognitive science.
« 3 » According to Martiny, a crucial 
aspect of Varela’s radical proposal consists 
in embodying cognition, in contrast to the 
disembodying aspects of classical cognitive 
science. In §17ff., Martiny parallels these 
disembodying aspects with similar ones 
that are present in Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy and that are criticized by Varela, Evan 
Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (VTR) in 
The Embodied Mind (EM; Varela, Thompson 
& Rosch 1991). Notwithstanding the fact 
that Husserl’s phenomenology is an essential 
source of inspiration for the development of 
the enactive proposal of EM, VTR argue 
that, in the end, it was “entirely theoretical” 
and that it “completely lacked any pragmatic 
dimension” (ibid: 19). Martiny stresses this 
firm judgment, which sees in Husserl’s phe-
nomenology an example of “disembodying 
philosophical practice” (§21). However, I 
would like to point out the fact that the rela-
tionship between Varela and Husserl’s phe-
nomenology is more complex than what can 
be seen in these passages. This is an aspect 
of Varela’s proposal that is easily overlooked 
but is important in order to understand the 
development of Varela’s view and the enac-
tive approach as originally formulated in 
EM. The issue is: in what way does phe-
nomenology lack a pragmatic dimension 
for VTR? In addition: why do VTR contrast 
phenomenology with the living pragmatics 
of mindfulness/awareness meditation in the 
Buddhist tradition?
« 4 » Martiny claims that the criticisms 
addressed by VTR to Husserl concern not 
“what” he described but “how” he did it 
(§18). VTR acknowledge the fact that, espe-
cially in The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl 
1970), Husserl acknowledged the practical 
and lived aspects of experience by devel-
oping the notion of “life-world,” but he did 
so in a purely theoretical way, developing a 
disembodied reflection on the embodiment 
of the mind. However, if we look at the de-
velopment of both Varela’s and Thompson’s 
philosophies after EM, we become aware 
that the criticism that they had in mind 
concerned not only the “how” but also the 
“what” of the phenomenological analysis 
of experience. These authors thought that, 
apart from some elements in Husserl’s later 
works such as the notion of life-world, most 
of the phenomenological analyses present us 
with an abstract and disembodied concep-
tion of subjectivity. In the words of Thomp-
son:
“ In The Embodied Mind, we asserted (i) that 
Husserl was a methodological solipsist (p. 16); 
(ii) that his theory ignored ‘both the consensual 
aspect and the direct embodied aspect of experi-
ence’ (p. 17); (iii) that his theory of intentionality 
was a representational theory (p. 68); (iv) that his 
theory of the life-world was reductionistic and 
representationalist (that he tried to analyze the 
life-world ‘into a more fundamental set of con-
stituents’ (p. 117) consisting of belief understood 
as mental representations (p. 18)); and (v) that his 
phenomenology was a purely abstract, theoreti-
cal project lacking a pragmatic dimension (p. 19, 
117).” (Thompson 2007: 413)
Thompson devotes appendix A of his Mind 
in Life (Thompson 2007: 413–416) to ex-
plaining in detail his “change of attitude” to-
ward Husserlian phenomenology. Thomp-
son claims that “our earlier interpretation 
of Husserl was mistaken” (Thompson 2007: 
413) and that:
“ Husserlian phenomenology has far more re-
sources than we realized for productive cross-
fertilization with both the sciences of mind […] 
and Buddhist thought […]. In particular, I now 
believe (i) that Husserl was not a methodological 
solipsist; (ii) that he was greatly concerned with 
the intersubjective and embodied aspects of expe-
rience; (iii) that his theory of intentionality was 
not a representational theory; and (iv) that his 
theory of the life-world was not reductionistic and 
representationalist.” (Thompson 2007: 413f)
« 5 » Thompson details the reasons why 
he and the other authors of EM were mis-
taken, admitting that, when they wrote EM, 
their knowledge of Husserl was limited and 
that they were misled by Martin Heidegger’s 
“largely uncharitable […] reading of Hus-
serl” (Thompson 2007: 414) and by Hubert 
Dreyfus’s influential interpretation of Hus-
serl as a “representationalist and proto-
cognitivist philosopher” (Thompson 2007: 
414).1
« 6 » This reappraisal had already been 
made by Varela, whose reference to Husserl’s 
phenomenology became more and more 
central after the publication of EM. Martiny 
(§31) acknowledges that the subsequent de-
velopment of neurophenomenology (Varela 
1996) and the second-person method (Vare-
la & Shear 1999) are essentially based on the 
phenomenological analysis of experience. In 
contrast to the hasty dismissal of Husserl’s 
project in EM, considered a “failure” (Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch 1991: 19), Varela (1996) 
considers the method of neurophenomenol-
ogy to be in accordance with the phenom-
enological method. I would like to stress the 
fact that this reappraisal concerns both the 
theoretical and pragmatic dimensions of 
phenomenology. Varela takes the concept 
of phenomenological reduction (PhR, ibid: 
336) and places it at the core of his neu-
rophenomenology. We should note that the 
PhR has been pointed out by Husserl’s crit-
ics as being responsible for the abstract and 
disembodied nature of phenomenological 
investigations. The typical example of this 
kind of criticism can be found in Heidegger 
(1992: 109ff.). Varela, on the contrary, sees 
in the PhR the “how” of the phenomenolog-
ical inquiry, which has significant theoreti-
cal and pragmatic implications.
« 7 » Varela likens PhR to mindfulness/
awareness meditation (Varela 1996: 331, 
346), which constitutes the “living pragmat-
ics” that lies at the basis of the enactive ap-
proach of EM. Varela considers the PhR to 
be a “capacity for becoming aware” (ibid: 
341), through which one can shift from the 
1 | These claims are reiterated by Thompson 






















Varela on the Pragmatic Dimension of Phenomenology  andrea Pace giannotta
Enaction
 CONSTRuCTIVIST FOuNDATIONs vol. 13, N°1
On the S c nd-Person Method  Susanne Ravn
natural, ordinary attitude of everyday life 
to a new, phenomenological attitude that 
looks at the same ordinary experience in a 
reflexive way. The method of PhR allows us 
to investigate the nature and the structural 
invariants of mental processes, by changing 
the unexamined experiences of the natural 
attitude into reflexive ones (ibid: 336). The 
ensuing phenomenological descriptions 
constitute an “‘embodiment’ that incarnates 
and shapes what we experience” (ibid: 337). 
So conceived, the method of PhR is very 
similar to mindfulness/awareness medita-
tion. This is a method for examining ex-
perience by becoming present with one’s 
mind (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 
23). Through mindfulness/awareness the 
meditator can interrupt the ordinary state of 
unmindfulness, cutting the chain of habitual 
thought patterns and preconceptions (ibid: 
27), in order to become acquainted with her 
experience and to examine the nature of 
both cognition and the objects of cognition.
« 8 » Varela considers the PhR a skill 
and a discipline that requires sustained 
training and that must be cultivated (Varela 
1996: 346). He also complains about the lack 
of pragmatic elaboration of the phenomeno-
logical method, whose potentialities for the 
investigation of the mind are yet to be fully 
utilized. Martiny (§31ff) shows well the sub-
sequent successful applications of Varela’s 
proposal made by him and his followers 
to open up and embody cognitive science. 
However, I would like to stress the fact that 
these developments and applications are 
based on a pragmatic dimension that Varela 
sees as already present in the phenomeno-
logical method.
« 9 » Furthermore, Varela points out 
some aspects of Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy that call into question the idea that it 
amounts to an abstract and disembodied 
view of subjectivity. Such a view would be 
based on a hypostatization of the duality 
between the cognizing subject and the cog-
nized object. On the contrary, according to 
Varela,
“ [PhR] does not sustain the basic subject-ob-
ject duality but opens into a field of phenomena 
where it becomes less and less obvious how to dis-
tinguish between subject and object (this is what 
Husserl called the ‘fundamental correlation’).” 
(Varela 1996: 339).
« 10 » Varela clearly sees that a certain 
line of development of Husserl’s phenom-
enology is the foundation of an embodied 
view of the mind, which converges with 
and complements the enactive approach. 
In Pace Giannotta (2016) I have argued for 
this convergence and complementarity be-
tween Varelian enactivism and Husserlian 
phenomenology, especially in its genetic 
development. In particular, the genetic 
analysis of the intentionality of the mind re-
veals a primordial process of co-constitution 
of subject and object in reciprocal depend-
ence. This notion converges with that of co-
dependent arising that is at the heart of the 
enactive approach of EM (Varela, Thomp-
son & Rosch 1991: 110ff, 220ff).
« 11 » This way of understanding Hus-
serl’s phenomenological project allows us 
to disclose its embodied aspect. As argued 
by Rudolf Bernet (2013), the investigation 
of the living and lived body as flesh, which 
is developed by phenomenologists such as 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levi-
nas and Michel Henry, is first introduced 
by Husserl himself in his analysis of bodily 
consciousness (especially in Husserl 1989). 
Claire Petitmengin also highlights the con-
tinuity between Varela’s neurophenomenol-
ogy and Husserl’s genetic phenomenology 
(Petitmengin 2017: 146), arguing that both 
investigate the “process of co-constitution” 
(ibid:142) of the “objective and subjec-
tive poles […] within lived experience” 
(ibid:141).
« 12 » However, having stressed the 
continuity between the theoretical and 
pragmatic aspects of both Varela’s proposal 
and phenomenology, we can detect an im-
portant difference between Husserl’s phe-
nomenology, including its most “embodied” 
developments, and the pragmatics of mind-
fulness/awareness meditation that plays 
such an important role in Varela’s view. I 
would like to refer to it as the existential di-
mension of Varela’s radical proposal. A large 
part of EM is devoted to describing how the 
practice of mindfulness/awareness leads the 
meditator to acknowledge the emptiness of 
the notion of a substantial, permanent and 
independent reality of both the self and the 
world. In its stead, the meditator becomes 
acquainted with the impermanent nature of 
all phenomena, both subjective and objec-
tive, and their co-dependent origination. 
The pragmatics of mindfulness/aware-
ness meditation embodies these theoreti-
cal achievements in a lived experience and 
a practice that is cultivated and shared by 
a vast community of practitioners. The 
pragmatic and existential implications of 
this practice are stressed by VTR: it allows 
the meditator to progressively free him-
self from the existential suffering (dukkha) 
that characterizes the human condition on 
many levels. This condition derives from 
the “grasping” attitude of the mind, which 
is naturally inclined to conceive of phenom-
ena as permanent and substantial. In his 
turn, the meditator sees the groundlessness 
and the emptiness of the notion of a sub-
stantial reality of all phenomena as a source 
of freedom, joy, and compassion (Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch 1991: 122f, 248). VTR 
point out the profound implications that 
the pragmatics of mindfulness/awareness 
meditation has on the life of practitioners 
and of the transformative potential that it 
can have on Western societies and culture at 
large. I would like to highlight this aspect of 
the enactive approach of EM and of Varela’s 
proposal, because it is often overlooked in 
subsequent discussions of “enactivism.” It 
is an “existential” dimension that addresses 
the fundamental issue of the meaning of the 
human condition.2
« 13 » Concerning this existential ques-
tion, Husserl’s phenomenology does not 
appear on the surface to have much to say. 
Notwithstanding this, its deconstruction of 
the subject-object duality is consistent with 
the notions of selflessness and co-depend-
ent arising. This applies also to some impli-
cations of the cognitive sciences that point 
toward the fragmentation or disunity of 
the self (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991: 
48ff) and of some strands of Western phi-
losophy, such as Hume’s deconstruction of 
the notion of a substantial self (ibid: 59ff). 
However, according to VTR, in these views 
there is also at play a refusal to confront the 
existential implications of the discovery of 
selflessness. On the contrary, the pragmat-
ics of mindfulness/awareness meditation 
2 | The central role of this existential aspect 
in Varela’s work is highlighted by Bitbol and Elena 
Antonova (2016: 356), Bitbol (2017: 151), Petit-
mengin (2017: 146), and Sebastjan Vörös (2017: 
150).
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consists in facing this discovery in order to 
find within it the source of existential trans-
formation.
« 14 » At the same time, these existen-
tial implications have repercussions on a 
theoretical level, loosening the “grasping at-
titude” that is at the basis of the search for an 
absolute metaphysical ground beyond the 
all-pervasive impermanence and emptiness 
of phenomena. Michel Bitbol (2008, 2012) 
refers to this crucial aspect of Varela’s view 
as the “Varelian” or “neurophenomenologi-
cal” stance.3 This stance leads us to dissolve 
the so-called “hard problem” of conscious-
ness (Chalmers 1995), by dismantling the 
foundationalist attitude that gives rise to it 
(see Bitbol & Antonova 2016: 355, Vörös 
2014: 104) and by experiencing the dis-
solution of the subject-object duality (Pe-
titmengin 2017: 145). In my opinion, this 
existential stance is a crucial component of 
Varela’s radical proposal and constitutes a 
further dimension of its way of embodying 
and opening up cognitive science.
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3 | The Varelian stance also leads us to high-
light the anti-foundationalist and anti-metaphys-
ical orientation of the original enactive approach 
of EM, in contrast to some contemporary forms 
of “domesticated enactivism” (Vörös, Froese & 
Riegler 2016: 198) that are characterized by a 
“shift towards realism” (ibid: 194).
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> Upshot • Varela’s description of how 
first-, second- and third-person posi-
tions are inserted in a network of so-
cial exchange forms a central ground 
for using a second-person position as 
a mediator in a phenomenological ex-
ploration of lived experiences. Based on 
Martiny’s arguments that we should 
expand the notion of the lab, I suggest 
that the fundamental circularity of the 
scientist and the first-person experienc-
es investigated needs to be considered 
in an extended form when involving a 
second-person method taking place in 
the conditions of the world of everyday 
life.
« 1 »  Kristian Martiny’s target article 
about ways to conduct cognitive science 
does not only present a very welcome over-
view of Francisco Varela’s proposals on how 
to open up and develop the way in which 
cognitive science is performed. He also, in 
the second part of the article, argues for 
how to use interviews – or “second-per-
son methods” to generate descriptions of 
experiences as lived. As my own research 
is based in the interdisciplinary field(s) 
of combining short-term ethnographical 
fieldwork/qualitative research methodolo-
gies with phenomenological analysis, in the 
following, I will primarily focus on outlin-
ing interdisciplinary considerations related 
to the latter part of Martiny’s article. Draw-
ing on the manner in which first-, second- 
and third-person positions are described 
as inserted in a network of social exchange 
– and change – in Varela and Jonathan 
Shear’s article (1999), I will specifically fo-
cus on how the use of the second-person 
position constructively mediates explora-
tions of the circulation that unfold between 
first- and third-person descriptions of phe-
nomena. I will argue that if the purpose of 
a second-person method is to contribute 
to the promotion of new and sustainable 
forms of collaboration (as claimed in §1), 
the fundamental circularity of the scientist 
and the investigation of lived experience 
need to be considered in an extended form 
that:
  involves methodological considerations 
on how the samples of the “cases” (the 
subject’s experiences of a phenomenon/
class of phenomenon) are selected and 
how relational conditions of the inter-
view situation are handled;
  clarifies the different communicative 
modes that can be at play when opening 
up the lab to involve the lived experi-
ences of subjects in a direct and/or per-
formative way.
« 2 » Firstly, Martiny presents an infor-
mative account of how Francisco Varela, 
Evan Thompson and Elanor Rosch (VTR) 
(1991) find it necessary to go back to the 
particularity of experiences as embodied 
and lived by the subject. Subsequently, he 
argues for the necessity of expanding the 
notion of the lab and involving explorations 
of phenomena as they unfold in and as part 
of the world of everyday life. In that sense, 
Varela’s insistence on including thorough 
exploration of first-person methodolo-
gies in cognitive sciences is aimed at being 
radically extended by involving the second-
person method of interviewing. Pursuing 
this aim, Martiny, however briefly, makes a 
reference to Bent Flyvbjerg’s work. Without 
embarking on a further description of Flyv-
berg’s methodological discussions, it seems 
fair to ask for considerations of the strate-
gies of the enquiry when dealing with “the 
detailed examination of a single example 
(or case) of a class of phenomena” (Flyvb-
jerg 2011: 301). Flyvbjerg very explicitly 
connects the characteristics of the design of 
such a study to how the different types of 
design influence the way results of analysis 
can be interpreted and contribute to general 
theoretical knowledge. Absolutely central to 
his work, and of specific relevance for the 
ambition of combining the second-person 
method with phenomenological analysis, is 
that Flyvbjerg presents four different strat-
egies related to the information-oriented 
selection of cases (all quotes are from Fly-
vbjerg 2011: 307):
